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The Critical Analyses of Propaganda of the Terrorism Deed

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Abstract. This paper analyses the propaganda of the terrorism deed as a form of terrorism that is different from mainstream terrorism. The propaganda of the deed is underpinned by specific political action which is meant to serve as a catalyst for revolution, and terror groups have, over the decades, used the propaganda of the deed to expand their operations and seek sympathisers. The concept became consolidated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Europe when proponents were driven by violence, which included bombings and assassinations, targeted at the ruling class. The aim was to entrench the spirit of revolt, to reinforce the belief that the state was not omnipotent and, by offering hope to the downtrodden, also to expand support for anarchist movements as the state grew more repressive in its response. This paper argues that modern-day terrorism has made great use of propaganda of the deed to carry out its violent missions. The paper examines the use of propaganda of the deed by modern-day terror groups, reflecting on how terrorism has evolved not only to be linked to non-state actors but also how states have become sponsors of terrorism to advance their interests. Finally, the paper examines how terrorism has emerged as a global security concern in a globalised era.

Keywords. Proxy Warfare, Terrorism, State and Non-State Actors

Introduction

Terrorism is described as a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form and tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and as a conspirational practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraint, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties (Moller-Leimkuhler, 2018).

Briefly, terrorists need wide media coverage of their deeds and the exaggerated ‘negative’ response from states to win the hearts and minds of the people; this enables them to acquire sympathy and increases membership. The Catechism of a Revolutionary (1869) written by Sergey Gennadiyevich Nechayev identified 21 principles which a terrorist ought to be guided by. Amongst these he argued that a terrorist has to be fully committed to revulsion, have no civility, have destruction as the only goal in mind, and must have no friendships or pity anything in the world, and be someone who views society as sick and ought to be destroyed because society is evil per se (Garrison, 2004). Many terror attacks, as argued by Marashi (2019), employ propaganda of the deed, acts based on the use of symbolic violence to generate mass media attention to the attackers “propaganda of the word,” and their manifestos published online

to inspire sympathisers and intimidate their opponents. Subscribing to this view, Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007) contend that terror groups such as the Al-Nusra Front or Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda, and The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, have all used violence and fear to commit various well-coordinated attacks. More observable however, is how the media has paid attention to these groups; ISIS for example even has its own monthly magazine which details the operations of the group. For these groups, the Islamophobia in the western world and the need to rule by Islamic laws have become recruitment tools which have allowed these groups to garner a plethora of supporters and sympathisers. Other phrases such as Muslims are under threat, the rise of global Islamophobia and the suppression of Muslim values and ideology have been used to garner international support. South Africa is no exception. As a member of the United Nations the country has a mandate to deal with terrorism among other national priorities, as part of its focus areas. This paper seeks to show how terrorist organisations have discredited the state and have made the state complicit in the commission of terrorism when they react to acts of terror by terrorist organisations. This paper reviewed the literature to further broaden the understanding of the propaganda of the terrorism deed and how the term has been used to inform the current trends in modern- day international terrorism.

From terrorism to propaganda of the deed

Garrison (2004) describes terrorism as asymmetric engagement of the enemy; that is why it does not require large memberships and why it is difficult to fight. Most terrorism since the early 19th century has been more reliant on populism to further its ends, relying on the government to retaliate violently and people becoming disillusioned and feeling that their plight would be better off than being under the governance of the government (Crenshaw, 1981; Larsen, 2020).

Terrorism is a deliberate and premeditated attempt to create terror through symbolic acts involving the use of threats of lethal force for creating psychological effects that will influence a target group or an individual and translate into political or material results (Kempen, 2016). This definition is important and different from other definitions as it involves the psychological effects - an element which is very important in classical terrorism. The state of mind of the victim in the aftermath of a terrorist attack is very important because it might determine whether or not citizens identify themselves with terrorist action. Furthermore, terrorism must be understood as a form of communication, to the state through the government and to the population under siege at large, (Shaw, 2012). Han (2018) perceives the act of terrorism in reality as an act of communication; for the terrorist the message matters, not the victim. Terrorism can be best understood as a violent communication strategy. There is a sender, the terrorist, a message generator, and the victim, the receiver, the public or the enemy. Without communication, there can be no terrorism. Therefore, some messages can be intended as propaganda with the aim of eliciting a counter-terrorist response' by the government. Propaganda is essentially a powerful strategic communication tool and that is the reason why a closer look at the concept of terrorism as propaganda of deed is required. Propaganda and terrorism are identical in so far as they both seek to influence a mass audience in a way that is intended to benefit the sponsor. But while terror has a singular purpose - inducing fear and uncertainty - propaganda can and does serve every imaginable purpose ranging from religion to politics and commerce. Crenshaw and Pimlott (2019) along the same lines aver that terrorism may also be intended to provoke counter-action from the government to increase publicity for the terrorist cause and to demonstrate to the people that their charges against the regime are well- founded. The terrorist means to force the state to show its repressive face, thereby driving the people into the arms of the challengers. For example, Wilson (1981) argued that the way to

win popular support was to provoke the regime to measures of greater repression and persecution. Provocative terrorism is designed to bring about revolutionary conditions rather than exploit them. The National Liberation Front (FLN) against the French in Algeria between 1954–62, the Palestinians against Israeli, the Red Army Faction (RAF) against the Federal Republic of Germany all appear to have used terrorism as a provocation.

A characteristic of terrorist propaganda that terrorist causes and (violent) measures are presented as being absolutely justified in their own righteousness, while their opponents are portrayed not simply as misguided, but as totally evil and corrupt oppressors. Evidence of this this would be Nigeria, where the rise of Boko Haram, led by Yusuf Mohammed is traceable to the pull and push effects of petty political thuggery, fragmented federalism, unemployment, fundamentalism, and massive corruption in Nigeria (Ani and Jakorotu 2017). It is a basic fact that that no large-scale terrorism is possible unless conditions for deprivation, injustice, loss of freedom, poverty or desire to perpetuate illegitimate power exist (Sethi, 2002).

Propaganda of the deed: perspectives and narratives

The phrase propaganda of the deed was first used in 1878 in Russia, when Vera Zasulich shot and injured General Dmitry Trepov. When Vera was acquitted by the jury, this was interpreted by terrorists as social approval of the use of terrorism, and its systematic use began (Campion, 2015). However, during the Italian nationalist struggle, the Risorgimento (1831-61), propaganda of the deed, the political aspect of irregular warfare, became not a means to an end but end in itself. For Giuseppe Mazzini, guerrillas were ‘the precursors of the nation, which they would rouse to insurrection’ (Sedgwick, 2004). Furthermore, propaganda of the deed sometimes overlaps and intertwines with revolutionary terrorism, as was the case during the Algerian revolution in 1954. Moreover, Rogers (1995) maintains that the FLN sought to provoke harsh French reprisals which would mobilise the population to support them and eliminate their rivals. The propaganda of the deed is “a symbolic act of political collective violence whose true impact supersedes the force of its military spectacle and derives from its ability to communicate and disseminate the message” (Bolt et al., 2008), but because the essence of propaganda of the deed is concerned with undermining the authority of the state, and the weakness can be amplified if the state retaliates in kind, the state fights with one hand tied behind its back. The insurgents may use words, ideas and violence but the state is banned from anything other than words. States are excluded from deploying propaganda of the deed, because as soon as the state resorts to it, it alienates its support base, further fueling the insurgency (Bolt et al., 2008).

The Institute of Security Studies notes (2017) that strategies based on the use of force allow terrorists to present themselves as soldiers or martyrs, and by violating human rights through overzealous military responses, governments risk exacerbating the conditions which gave rise to extremism in the first place. If governments violate human rights and discriminate against ethnic and religious groups in the fight against terrorism, they may also facilitate recruitment into extremist groups (Kempen, 2019:18). Another example is that of Islamic extremism in Northern Mozambique. Just as in Italy’s Risorgimento, according to Shannon Ebrahim (Independent Online news report, April 2020), The Islamic forces have changed tactics, adopting carrot and a stick approach; while terror and beheadings are used to instill fear, a new campaign has been launched; this campaign involves attempts by terrorist’s organizations to win the hearts and the minds of the people in order to increase their membership. It has been somewhat successful in this regard as it takes over local banks and grocery stores and hands out money and food to local people, who have applauded such tactics. The insurgents carried out a large military operation, capturing Mocimboa, taking over a military base and capturing military

equipment for two battalions as well as boats and patrol vessels. They destroyed the airport facilities and government buildings, and released prisoners from jail, largely adopting the modus operandi of the Islamists extremists operating in West Africa and the Sahel. These constitute a clear classical case of propaganda of the deed in the SADAC region which might lead South Africa to be drawn directly or indirectly into the conflict.

Middle East propaganda of the deed

Another classic example, provided by Bolt et al. (2008), is the propaganda by the deed which found fresh ground and application on the other side of the world. The Jewish terrorist group 'Fighters for the Freedom of Israel' and the Irgun Zval Leumi used terror to force the British out of Palestine. The Stern Gang assassinated Lord Moyne, the British Ambassador to Palestine, on 6 November 1944. The Irgun bombed the King David Hotel in Jerusalem on 22 July 1946 killing 91 people and injuring another 46. The terror implemented by the Stern Gang and the Irgun played a central part in bringing the majority of Yishur (the Jewish community living in Palestine who were committed to reliance on Britain) around to their view that British friendship was irrelevant to the goal of securing Palestine as a Jewish State (Wagner, 2010). Here, the classic terrorist argument that government repression would drive the people to the side of the terrorist was borne out. The British withdrew from Palestine in 1948 and the United Nations partitioned Palestine into the state of Israel and the Palestinian State (Bolt et al., 2008). Still on the Middle East, current events there reveal related dynamics. Hamas and other Islamic groups have been locked in competition with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) for the leadership of the Palestinian people. Part of the motivation for terrorist attacks is to provoke a repressive Israeli response, thereby radicalising the population and bolstering support for extremism (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007). The propaganda of the deed is an important tool for most terrorists because generally they are weak and do not have advanced governmental infrastructure at their disposal and, in some cases, you will find that some act as lone wolves, to attract attention and publicity to themselves. It is important for them to act big and have their action exaggerated irrespective of the victims and casualties of their act. All that matters to the terrorists is the desired results and governmental response, a government that is bound by laws and regulations.

Campion (2015) provides an oblique approach to propaganda of the deed through examining how propaganda factored into terrorist and Pentagon planning. Confining the study to terrorism after 2001, he considers Al Qaeda's ability to comprehend and implement propaganda of the deed. Accordingly, the 9/11 attacks were propaganda of the deed in action, targeting economic, military and cultural symbols. Sedgewick (2015) considers four possible explanations of what Al Qaeda was hoping to achieve on 9/11. Some explanations are based on the assumption that Al Qaeda's immediate objectives, as well as its ultimate aims, were purely religious. However, Sedgewick argues that the most likely explanation is that Al Qaeda hoped to provoke the United States' reaction that it did in fact provoke, with the radicalising consequences for its primary constituency that did in fact follow (Sedgewick, 2015: 37). It may be rash to argue that the actual consequences of any action were those originally intended, but there is some evidence that Al Qaeda did intend these consequences (Garrison, 2004: 796). The irony about the 9/11 response to Al Qaeda is the consequence that followed, namely, that this extremist group gained popularity all over the world, being seen as powerful by hitting the underbelly of the United States of America. After the attack, popular support for Al Qaeda and the Taliban soared in various parts of the world, with support and membership being drawn from Canada, France, England and even the United States itself. The counter terrorism measures adopted by the United States saw the steady increase of terrorism in different parts of the World

including Africa in the Sahel and the Great Lakes region and, moving south of the equator, in Kenya where Al Shaabab extremists are wreaking havoc through terror. As pointed out earlier, this extremism is also seen in Southern African region, in Cabo Delgado in Mozambique.

Non-State actors and their role in terrorism

‘Non-state actors’ can be described as armed non-governmental groups that engage in terrorism either national or transnational. Bolkom (2006:201) describes ‘non- state actors’ as an umbrella term that refers to a number of armed groups such as political terrorists, narco traffickers, paramilitary insurgents and even international organised criminal organisations. Non-state organisations are usually funded by foreign nations and they also engage in drug trafficking and crime to supplement their income. Non state actors are sometimes encouraged by the incapacity or failure of the state to govern, thereby providing opportunities for actors who operate outside national and international law to commit atrocities, such as beheading the citizens, to instil fear among the local population. Baylouny (2010:136) argues that territories are becoming effectively stateless even in the geographic heart of the nominal state itself; new actors and institutions fulfil roles previously considered the preserve of the state. Gangs, militias, thugs, local men of influence and religious political parties are the main contenders for authority. By engaging in terrorism, these groups sometimes depend on the state to acquire membership. The state responds harshly to the terrorist activities of these groups, thereby inflicting collateral damage to the population, which results in citizens turning against from the state. This practice is known as propaganda of the deed.

Proxy wars as factors encouraging terrorism

Karl Deutsch, a political scientist, termed proxy wars as ‘an international conflict between two foreign powers, fought out on the soil of a third country, disguised as a conflict over an internal issue of that country and using some of that country’s manpower, resources and as a means for achieving predominantly foreign goals and foreign strategies’. Proxies are a very good way of engaging in a war without direct involvement. Direct engagement is costly in terms of manpower and drains the economy as well. Proxies were seen when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. In response, the United States of America trained and funded the Mujahedeen to fight against the Soviet Union. Another example is when The United States together with South Africa invaded Angola to topple the government of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) led by Augustino Neto. The Soviet Union could not directly engage in this war, so they used Cuba as their proxy to ensure that the government stayed in power. This resulted in the defeat and the withdrawal of SANDF troops after the Battle of Cuito Canavale in the province of Cuando Cubango. This was important because it led to the implementation of resolution 435 of the UN Security Council. This resolution saw to it that the South African government would withdraw from Namibia and resulted in the stability of the Southern African region.

In Indonesia, proxies are becoming technologically advanced with the use of the internet and the computer. As of December 2019, 171.26 million out of the country's total population of over 270 million were active internet users. From that figure, 16, 68 % comes from the age group of 13-18 years and 49.52% from the age group of 19-34 years (Affan, 2018). Thus 76% of the internet users in Indonesia come from the age group of 13-34 years. This age group is the Millennial, the generation born between 1981 and 2000. By this fact, the Indonesian Millennial are one the groups that have the most potential as proxies. This indicates that youth is more vulnerable to being used by Islamic State of Iraq and the al-Sham (ISIS) to carry out their terrorist activities because of exposure to the internet. This type of information technology

usage is difficult to track by the authorities because it is not easy to identify the threat and there is no identifiable battlefield. In Syria and Iraq, however, the instability in the region has created a suitable climate for the growth of the proxy called Jamaah Tawhid al- Jihad.

Finally, Mumford (2013) clarifies the issue of proxy intervention as a cause for promoting terrorism; he cites Philip Bobbitt, a United States constitutional theorist who argued that “In the future, the use of local proxy armies can offer an economic alternative to more expensive standing armies and could provide the indispensable element of ground control without risking American lives to the same degree as US ground forces”.

States as agents of terror

A state can be defined as an organised political government in a designated territory. A state governs democratically while others practice other forms of statehood, like totalitarianism. Previously, there was a clear distinction between a state and a terrorist organisation; a state governs while a terrorist organisation strives to disturb the governance of the state through violence and to instil fear because of political demands and differences. In modern times however, the state’s role has shifted, and some states find themselves performing terrorist acts outside their territories, which in essence become a state of war. A case in point is the acts committed by the United States of America in November 27 2020, when they killed Qasem Suilemani; the leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, in Bagdad in Iraq. According to Malkoutikhah (2020), the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF), which was led by Suilemani, had a foreign policy role in exerting influence throughout the Middle East by supporting pro-Iranian policies. The IRGC-QF was in the conflict zone in Iraq and Syria fighting ISIS as foreign terrorist organisation as well as Syrian militants opposed to the Bashaar Al-Assad regime. While it true that Iran suffers the brunt of this activities with the killing of nuclear scientists - the latest being the assassination of Iranian Scientist Mohsen Fakrizadeh in November 2020 by Mossad, an Israeli Intelligence Agency- other countries suffer destabilisation by the United States of America, like Venezuela for example.

External intervention in the affairs of sovereign states as a cause of terrorism

The United States has been regarded as the world’s policeman by getting involved in various parts of the world for a variety of reasons, some valid and others invalid. A glaring example is the attack in Iraq, an attack which was based on false intelligence that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction - weapons which were never found. Such interventions have prompted non-state actors to develop a hostile posture towards the United States of America, a hostility which could be seen in the 9/11 attacks. President Bill Clinton is quoted in Eland (1998:2) as observing: ‘Americans are targets of terrorism in part because we have unique leadership responsibilities in the world, because we act to advance peace and democracy and because we stand united against terrorism’. While this statement is partly true, the United States of America only regards groups who are anti-American as terrorist groups, like the Taliban, but they support pro- American groups financially and militarily when their acts of terror are against countries that do not have a good relationship with the United States; a case in point is the support of anti-Assad groups in Syria which the Russians regard as terrorist organisations. In another example, Osama Bin laden trained and armed the Somalis under Mohammed Farah Aideed to attack the United States peacekeeping force in 1992. According to Eland (1998:8) the result of the attack was 18 dead U S Army Rangers and the US withdrawal from Somalia. Osama Bin Laden did not merely object to US intervention in Somalia. In fact, his main reason for attacking U S targets was the American presence in Saudi Arabia.

Challenges of addressing terrorism

Undoubtedly, the quest to address terrorism unites the global village. However, one cannot help but observe the many challenges that have become stumbling blocks in the quest to eliminate global terrorism. Vaisman-Tzachor (2018) argues that the need to address terrorism has become imperative to ensure an effective global security apparatus underpinned by cooperation and coordination, but challenges remain. Together, the following challenges have affected a united global response to terrorism.

The global financing of terrorism

One of the major challenges in combatting terrorism is the inability to stop its financing. Andrianova (2020) asserts that the driving force behind the ability of transnational terrorist organisations (TTOs) to operate and become financially stable lies in their ability to secure donations from people, states and organisations which support their ideological goals. Monies are disguised as other activities (humanitarian purposes) and are concealed from the authorities. These monies end up in the hands of TTO's who use them to purchase weapons and increase their power and influence. For example, in 2015, the Islamic State's monthly revenues were estimated to be \$81 million dollars. Activities such as oil production, smuggling, trafficking and kidnapping, and weapon sales contributed to the revenue of the group. Terrorists often finance their operations by selling drugs, poaching rhinos, or counterfeiting goods (Wilson Center, 2018). Moreover, de Goede (2018) reflects that terrorism financing is complex and difficult to trace; TTO's are not so concerned with where the money comes from, rather the focus is on concealing it and hiding the purpose for which it has been collected. Terrorists and terrorist organisations, therefore, employ techniques similar to those used by money launderers to hide their money. For Zdanowicz (2009), those who finance terrorism do not spend large amounts of money to avoid detection and also to avoid the attention of both governments and financial institutions. Additionally, terrorist financiers also use trade-based money laundering schemes to get their money across borders. This is becoming more common, and it is a difficult issue to keep one step ahead of. Between those tactics and online money transfer systems, financiers of terrorists can create huge and complex networks of which the public sector is only just starting to scratch the surface.

State sponsored terrorism

The financing of terrorism is not only restricted to non-state actors. States are also involved in the financing of terrorism to achieve their own goals. Realism as an international relations theory asserts that the state is a unitary actor and even though other non-state actor organisations, NGOs and civil society groups exist, they do not possess the same power and influence. State-sponsored terrorism is defined as the support given to violent non-state actors by governments to achieve their goals through terrorism (Maogoto, 2003; Byman and Kreps, 2010; Wolf, 2017). There are several ways in which states sponsor terrorism; these include providing training, supplying weapons, and hosting groups within their borders. The US State Department designates four countries as sponsors of terrorism, (Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Iran, and Syria) (Rennack, 2015). However, Middle Eastern countries have also been accused of sponsoring terrorism to advance their regional interests. The Gulf States of Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, together with Iraq, have often accused Qatar of being the hub of terrorism financing. The US and Saudi Arabia have also voiced concerns with regards to Qatar's links to terrorist financing, shining a spotlight on decades-old practices that the country has engaged in (Voice of America, 2017).

State fragility and the growth of terror Organisations

The rate at which terror organisations have grown has caught governments off-guard. Developing countries are often at the mercy of TTO's. The breakdown in governance coupled with political instability and widespread conflicts in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Syria, the DRC, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq and Yemen have given rise to anarchy where groups battle the state for control (Crisis group, 2021). The inability to exercise effective jurisdiction over its territory has seen some TTO's take control of large swathes of territory. For example, in Syria, some sections of the country are controlled by Militias and TTO's. The same can be seen in the DRC and the Central African Republic. This inability of the state to exact control over its territory increases the ability of TTO's to gain more power and influence (Akdedian and Hasan, 2020). In many parts of Africa, the increasing rates of terrorism have also been blamed on the ethnicity and religious intolerance (Agbiji & Swart, 2015). An unstable and divided population, suffering from a torn social fabric, minimum social control, and pervasive strife that encourages exit from rather than loyalty to the state are considerable challenges that need to be addressed. Moreover, many countries which are prone to terrorist attacks or which harbour terrorists have been characterised by underdevelopment and a lack of effective judicial structures, which then paves the way for recourse to conflict-ridden, violent, non-systemic and extra-constitutional ways in which to articulate grievances and seek redress. Issues of cronyism, poverty, corruption, slow levels of economic growth, the marginalisation of the youth, and ethnoreligious conflicts are other drivers of terrorism in the developing world (Bagchi and Paul, 2018; Ajide and Alimi, 2021). Even though developing nations are most likely to feel the true brunt of terrorism, that is not to say that developed nations are safe from the ideological teachings that have become a key feature of terrorism today. This has been evidenced by the lone wolf attacks in Europe which have all been driven by ideological support for terror groups such as The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and Al Qaeda. However, it is important to ensure that a global response to terrorism is all-compassing and addresses the root factors which give rise to this highly politicised issue.

Coordinating a global response to terrorism

Addressing terrorism (especially considering its wide reach) needs a unified approach that is underpinned by common goals and objectives. The inability to address terrorism lies in the failure to stop the flow of funds that support TTOs. In this regard there have been policies and international conventions adopted to ensure money laundering and terrorism financing are addressed. The 1988 UN Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was the first international convention that criminalised money laundering and terrorism financing (Bewley-Taylor, 2003; Naheem, 2020). The Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) 40 Recommendations (1990) were aimed at improving national legal systems, enhancing the role of the financial sector and intensifying cooperation in the fight against money laundering. The UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2003) and the UN Convention Against Corruption (2005) declared that the offence of moneylaundering should not only apply to the proceeds of illicit drug trafficking but should also cover the proceeds of all serious crimes (Rose, 2020). The UN General Assembly Resolution 60/288 (Sep. 2006) is a unique global instrument that was intended to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter-terrorism (Rosand, Millar & Ipe, 2008). However, these conventions and policies are not binding in nature; hence individual countries need to adopt their own measures to prevent laundering and terrorism financing. Moreover, these policies and conventions do not address the core drivers of terrorism such as underdevelopment, political instability, poor economic growth, and ethnoreligious conflicts. It

is important to reflect that money flowing into TTO's is not the initial cause of terrorism, hence it becomes imperative to address the root causes that give rise to terrorism rather than addressing one element within the quest to fight terrorism. There is also a need to address the unequal rates of development globally and examine how this gives rise to terrorism. So long as the gap between the rich and poor countries widens, political instability is bound to creep in and thus increase conflicts and violence, giving way to an increased possibility of terrorism. Individual countries have made big strides, but success is measured in relative terms and major disparities persist. While some countries can spend billions of dollars on countering terrorism, others struggle to put in place even the basic measures needed to protect their borders and bring terrorists to justice. When a large proportion of a country's population lives in poverty it is no surprise that they put scarce resources into development rather than counter-terrorism, just like developing regions (Swatton, 2020).

Conclusion and recommendations

The paper has confirmed that Propaganda of the Terrorism Deed is a persistent global phenomenon with its causalities and consequences. This was achieved through the presented examples from different countries in the form of providing evidence of propaganda of the deed. The paper concludes that propaganda of the deed is a powerful tool for perpetuating terrorism, as it plays on the strength of the powerful to garner support for the weak if the state understands the power of propaganda, their response to terrorist activity should be measured and be within the bounds of the rule of law to ensure that terrorists do not play on the strength of the state or the government. Governments should develop their own propaganda of the deed as a response to terrorist acts. Even people at large should understand or be taught that forceful anti-terrorist measures are unsuitable as a means for regime change and that any change must not be driven by outside or foreign terrorist agents. The paper recommends improved political education and social and economic development to ensure the security of both developed and developing countries. This suggests that social development should focus on improving and advancing human well-being through effective utilisation of social resources. The adoption and implementation of universally binding international laws to address terrorism is still at the infant phase because of continuous global attacks.

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